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A Question of Intent: Aiding and Abetting Law and the
Rule of Accomplice Liability Under § 924(c)
Tyler B. Robinson
Firearms are common tools of the violent-crime and drug
trafficking trades. Their prevalence is reflected in the frequency
with which federal prosecutors charge, juries apply, and courts re
view 18 U.S.C. §924(c).1 That provision imposes heavy penalties
for either the use or carrying of a firearm "during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime," in addition to the
punishment provided for the underlying violent or drug-related of
fense.2 A conviction under section 924(c) carries at the very least a
mandatory, consecutive five-year sentence, even when the underly
ing crime already provides enhanced punishment for use of a dan
gerous weapon during its commission.3 The sentence increases to
twenty years for a second or subsequent conviction, and further in1. A quick Westlaw search reveals more than 800 cases involving 18 U.S.C.§ 924(c) in
the federal courts during 1996 alone. Search of Westlaw, Allfeds Database (Oct.12, 1997).
During 1995, moreover, 30% of all reported murder, robbery, and aggravated assault of
fenses collectively involved the use of firearms. See Department of Justice, Federal Bureau
of Investigation Press Release (Oct.13, 1996) <http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr95prs.htm>.
2. 18 U.S.C.§ 924(c)(l) (1994). Section 924(c)'s drug trafficking prong covers any felony
punishable under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1994), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C.§§ 951-71 (1994), or the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. app.§§ 1901-04 (1994). See 18 U. S.C.§ 924(c)(2).
The statute's crime-of-violence prong reaches any predicate felony that "has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of
another, or ...that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. " 18
U.S.C.§ 924(c)(3).
3. See 18 U.S.C.§ 924(c)(l). For example, a five-year term of imprisonment under
§ 924(c) may be added to a sentence under 18 U.S.C.§ 2113 for armed bank robbery, even
though§ 2113(d) already enhances the sentence for bank robbery from a 20-year to a 25-year
maximum if the defendant "puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous
weapon or device." 18 U.S.C.§ 2113(d) (1994). At least one district court has concluded
that a consecutive§ 924(c) sentence on top of a sentence enhancement provided by the pred
icate statute constitutes double jeopardy - punishment twice for the same offense - unless
the elements of a§ 924(c) violation encompass a different set of actions than do the elements
of a § 2113(d) violation. See United States v. Foreman, 914 F. Supp. 385, 387 ( C.D. Cal.
1996). The Supreme Court has firmly established, however, that if there is clear legislative
intent to impose two separate, cumulative punishments for the same conduct, there is no
double jeopardy violation. See Missouri v.Hunter, 459 U.S.359, 368-69 (1983).
Congress expressly provided such intent with respect to§ 924(c) following two Supreme
Court decisions, handed down in 1978 and 1980, that held§ 924(c) inapplicable to cases in
which the predicate felony statute contained its own sentence enhancement provision for the
use of a dangerous weapon. See Busic v.United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980); Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978). In 1984 Congress responded by expressly amending the
language of§ 924(c) to
ensure that all persons who commit Federal crimes of violence, including those crimes
set forth in statutes which already provide for enhanced sentences for their commission
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creases in specified increments - to a maximum of thirty years for
a first offense and life without parole for a subsequent conviction depending on the type of firearm employed, and on whether the
firearm is equipped with a silencer or muffler.4 Accordingly, sec
tion 924(c) draws a broad range of underlying criminal activity
within the scope of additional mandatory penalties whenever a fire
arm is involved.
The breadth and severity of section 924(c)'s application to vio
lent and drug-related crimes makes it all the more important that
an adequate check be placed on the statue's application to accom
plices to the predicate offense. Federal courts have failed, however,
to elucidate a clear or consistent rule of accomplice liability under
section 924(c). Under 18 U.S.C.§ 2 anyone who "aids, abets, coun
sels, commands, induces or procures" the commission of a federal
offense is punishable as if he had committed the crime himself.5
Judge Learned Hand provided in United States v. Peoni6 what has
become the definitive rule for accomplice liability under this stat
ute: a defendant must "associate himself'' with the criminal venture
of the principal, and "participate in it as in something that he wishes
to bring about, that he seek[s] by his action to make ...succeed."7
Although courts addressing accomplice liability under section
924(c) consistently recite Judge Hand's formulation of section 2 in
Peoni,8 they do so reflexively, echoing the language of the rule with
insufficient attention to the theoretical rationale behind it.
The Peoni rule has thus become disconnected, body from spirit,
as courts have relied on the same statement of the rule to articulate
two divergent standards for determining when a defendant is an ac
complice to a principal's use or carrying of a firearm during a viawith a dangerous weapon, receive a mandatory sentence, without the possibility of the
sentence being made to run concurrently with that for the underlying offense.
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 313 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U. S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3491. Thus, there is
no double jeopardy conflict when§ 924(c) imposes an additional consecutive sentence for the
same conduct that is already punished under the predicate statute. See, e.g., United States v.
Bishop, 66F.3d 569, 573-75 {3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Centeno-Torres, 50F.3d 84 (1st
Cir. 1995).
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 924{c)(1).
5. 18

u.s.c. § 2 {1994).

6. 100F.2d 401 {2d Cir. 1938).
7. 100 F.2d at 402; see also United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 641 {6th Cir. 1994)
(citing Peoni and noting that all federal circuits have adopted Judge Hand's interpretation of
§ 2).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Delpit, 94F.3d 1134, 1150-51 {8th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Cruz-Paulino, 61F.3d 986, 998 {1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Lowery, 60F.3d 1199, 1202
(6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ortega, 44F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Monroe, 990F.2d 1370, 1373 {D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Langston, 970F.2d 692, 705
{10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Horton, 921F.2d 540, 543 {4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Smith, 832F.2d 1167, 1170 {9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Reicherter, 647F.2d 397, 401 {3d
Cir. 1981); United States v. Alvarez, 610 F.2d 1250, 1253 {5th Cir. 1980); see also United
States v. Medina, 32F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing, but not reciting, Peom).
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lent or drug-trafficking crime. Both standards require that in the
course of the predicate offense - the crime of violence or drug
trafficking during which the principal uses or carries a :firearm the accomplice must know that the principal is armed.9 Because
the language of section 924(c) does not provide for a specific mens
rea element, courts infer that knowledge of the facts constituting
the offense establishes the required level of culpability.10 As
knowledge constitutes the requisite criminal intent of the principal
violator of section 924(c), knowledge must also be established on
the part of the accomplice, the logic being that in order for the lat
ter to merit the same level of punishment as the former, he must
share the same level of culpability.11
The two standards diverge, however, in the level of participation
necessary to support an inference that the defendant, in the Ian9. Knowledge can only be inferred through circumstantial evidence, for it is impossible to
prove directly what was subjectively in the mind of the defendant. Thus, although courts
uniformly embrace the knowledge requirement, they may differ as to the extent of circum
stantial evidence sufficient to support an inference that the defendant knew the principal had
a firearm. Compare United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1316 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that
an accomplice's surveillance of a Brink's truck, which was accompanied by two armed guards
during its scheduled stop, supported an inference that the defendant knew that a planned
robbery of the truck would require the use of weapons in order to subdue the guards) with
United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d 551, 558-59 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting an inference that
an accomplice to an armed bank robbery must have known that the principal would use a
gun because it would be hard for him to rob the bank without one).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Santeramo, 45 F.3d 622, 623-24 (2d Cir. 1995)
("[K]nowledge of the facts constituting the offense ordinarily is implicit in a criminal statute
that does not expressly provide a mental element."); United States v. Wtlson, 884 F.2d 174,
177-79 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Michael J. Riordan, Using a Fireann During and in Relation to

a Drug Trafficking Crime: Defining the Elements of the Mandatory Sentencing Provision of

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l), 30 Duo. L. REv. 39, 44-46 (1991). When knowledge of the facts consti
tuting the offense is the requisite level of mens rea necessary to find a defendant guilty, the
offense is said to be a "general intent" crime, meaning the level of culpability does not rise to
a "specific intent" on the part of the defendant to purposely bring about the facts constituting
the offense. Sometimes the co=on law or statutory definition of a particular crime requires
the former level of culpability, while other crimes require the latter. Certain other crimes
specify an even lesser level of culpability, such as "recklessness," meaning the defendant
acted out of reckless disregard for the facts constituting the commission of the offense, or
"negligence," meaning the defendant unreasonably failed to recognize the facts constituting
the offense. See generally MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02 (1962). Negligence, recklessness,
knowledge, and purpose describe increasing levels of culpability such that a purposive intent
satisfies a mens rea standard of knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, while knowledge of
the facts constituting the offense satisfies a recklessness or negligence standard, but not pur
pose, and so on. See MODEL PENAL CoDE§ 2.02.

11. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting a "nat
ural and probable consequences" standard for accomplice liability under§ 924(c) in favor of
a knowledge requirement, as the second "puts the accomplice on a level with the principal,
requiring the same knowledge for both"); cf. United States v. Batt, 811 F. Supp. 625, 628 (D.
Kan. 1993) (concluding that "[a] negligence standard would not support the imposition of
criminal liability on the principal, and it should likewise not support accomplice liability");
WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., SUBSTANrIVE CruM!NAL LAw § 6.8, at 158
(1986) (criticizing a natural-and-probable consequences rule of accomplice liability because it
would "permit liability to be predicated upon negligence even when the crime involved re
quires a different state of mind" (footnote omitted)).
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guage of Peoni, participated in the principal's section 924(c) offense
"as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek[s] by
his action to make ... succeed."12 Under one standard - which
this Note will refer to as the broad standard of liability - the de
fendant who knows that the principal is armed can be held liable as
an accomplice to the section 924(c) violation when he acts with the
intention to assist or influence the commission of the underlying
predicate crime.13 Under the second - or narrow - standard,
however, courts require more specifically that a defendant act with
the intention directly to facilitate the use or carrying of the gun by
the principal, beyond mere participation in the predicate crime that
underlies the prinCipal's section 924(c) offense.14
For purposes of illustrating this distinction, imagine that two
men, P and A, rob a bank. Both men enter the bank, and P holds
up the teller and customers at gunpoint while A goes behind the
teller window and stuffs a bag with cash. P and A are both guilty of
bank robbery.15 P also violates section 924(c).16 A clearly knew
that P used a firearm in the commission of the robbery in which he
participated, and, for purposes of this hypothetical, we can assume
that P and A agre.ed ahead of time that P would hold everyone at
gunpoint. Under the broad standard of accomplice liability, A
aided and abetted P's use of the firearm by participating in and
facilitating the bank robbery, knowing that P used the firearm to
further the robbery. Under the narrow standard, however, A did
not directly facilitate the use of the firearm merely by stuffing bags
with money and therefore did not aid and abet P's section 924(c)
12. United States v. Peoni, 100F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
13. See, e. g., United States v. DePace, 120 F.3d 233, 238-39 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding
accomplices who carried firearms liable for§ 924(c) violations on the basis of their participa
tion in an underlying scheme to steal large quantities of marijuana from undercover DEA
agents); United States v. Simpson, 979F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding the defend
ant's conduct, which was integral to the predicate crime of bank robbery, sufficient to hold
her liable as an accomplice to the principal's use of a firearm during the robbery); Powell, 929
F.2d at 729 (finding that an accomplice can only be held liable under§ 924(c) if he "knew to a
practical certainty" that the principal would be using or carrying a firearm).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Bancalari, 110F.3d 1425, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the defendant "must have knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the use or carrying
of the firearm during and in relation to the" predicate crime of kidnapping); United States v.
Salazar, 66F.3d 723, 729 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that to convict the defendant as an accom
plice to the use of a gun during a prison escape, the government must prove that the defend
ant knew about the gun and took some action designed to assist the principal's use of the
gun); United States v.Luciano-Mosquera, 63F.3d 1142, 1150 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the
defendant accomplice must have known about the gun and taken "some action in relation to
the [firearm] that was intended to cause the firearm to be carried during and in relation to
the drug trafficking offense").
15. See 18 U.S. C. § 2113(a) (1994) ("Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation,
takes . . . any property or money . . . belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank . . . (s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both.").
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) (1994).
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violation, even though he knew that P would use a firearm in order
to commit the robbery.17
Whatever strikes the reader as the more intuitively appealing
rule of liability in the above hypothetical, both standards are prob
lematic in that neither holds true to the rule of accomplice liability
set out in Peoni
at least not all of the time. As presently con
ceived,18 the broad standard threatens overinclusive liability in cer
tain circumstances, while t h e narrow standard may be
underinclusive. Additional hypotheticals demonstrate these de
fects. Under the broad standard, A, who participated in a simple
hand-to-hand drug deal that, in and of itself, had nothing to do with
using or carrying a firearm so far as he was concerned, can never
theless be convicted of aiding and abetting the carrying of the gun
that co-dealer P carried to the deal. A is considered an accomplice
to P's section 924(c) violation under this broad standard if he par
ticipated in the drug transaction merely aware of and able to bene
fit from the gun's presence, even though it was exclusively P's
actions and intentions that determined that a firearm had any rela
tion to the transaction.19 Under Peoni, however, because A does
not act intentionally to bring about P's carrying of the firearm, A
should not be held liable as an accomplice. Thus, the broad stan
dard may be overinclusive relative to Peoni.
-

On the other hand, the narrow standard may be underinclusive
of the Peoni rule. A, who masterminded and organized a plan to
commit armed robbery knowing that firearms would be integral to
effect its commission and fully intending - although not expressly
instructing - that they be used, could nevertheless successfully in
sulate himself from section 924(c) liability. He could do so by re
maining comfortably at home while his subordinates P and Q
execute the plan with the implicit understanding that they will have
to use their own guns to pull it off. A's ability to evade accomplice
liability in this case similarly neglects the Peoni rule.20
17. If additional facts demonstrated, however, that A had provided the gun for P to use,
or that it had been A's idea to use a gun in the first place, A might be said to have assisted or
influenced P's use of the firearm and then could be held liable as an accomplice to the
§ 924(c) offense under the narrow standard as well.
18. The standards "as conceived" are not to be confused with the standards "as applied."
In applying the standards, courts readily, although not universally, conform conceptually
flawed rules to intuitively just results, and vice versa. See infra note 106. But this is no
answer for failing to articulate a reasoned rule of liability, for if it were, there would be no
reason for a rule of law at all - we would simply entrust courts to provide ad hoc, intuitively
appealing outcomes.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 230-31 (6th Cir. 1992) (en bane),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 74-82.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 45-47 (2d Cir. 1994), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 107-14.
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This Note neither fully rejects nor singly embraces either stan
dard of liability. It seeks, rather, to define a realm of circumstances
under which each respective standard permits a court properly to
infer a purposive intent on the part of an accomplice to "bring
about" the principal's use or carrying of a firearm in violation of
section 924(c). On another level, then, the object is to revitalize the
language of Peoni - to which courts applying inconsistent stan
dards consistently claim allegiance - with a clear and uniform
meaning. Toward that end, this Note advocates a context-respon
sive standard of accomplice liability under section 924(c), whereby
the participation required of the defendant to aid and abet the fire
arm offense responds to the circumstances of the principal's "use"
or "carrying" of the firearm during a predicate violent or drug-traf
ficking crime.
This Note proceeds cautiously. The divergent standards courts
currently apply reflect confusion over, and a shortage of reflection
on, the dual mens rea requirement of complicity law as applied to
the multilayered structure of section 924(c)'s proscription against
"use" or "carrying" of a firearm in connection with a second, under
lying predicate offense. This Note therefore endeavors to fully de
velop the building blocks of the analysis in their own right before
moving on to the design of a new accomplice liability regime under
section 924(c). Part I reflects on the nature of complicity doctrine21
and suggests that under the language of Peoni, an accomplice is
punishable to the same extent as the principal only when (1) both
share the same mens rea with respect to the commission of the prin
cipal's offense, and (2) the accomplice acts with the purpose to as
sist or influence the principal to commit the acts constituting that
offense. Part II dismantles section 924(c) into its component parts
of "carrying" or "use" and sets forth two distinct contexts to which
divergent standards of accomplice liability might independently ap
ply. In light of the Peoni rule's intentional act requirement dis
cussed in Part I, Parts III and IV then advance different standards
of accomplice liability in the "carrying" and "use" contexts, as de
fined in Part II. Part III argues that section 924(c)'s "carrying"
prong should require application of the narrow standard of liability
under which a defendant must directly facilitate the principal's car
rying of the firearm in order to aid and abet section 924(c). Part IV
suggests that section 924(c)'s "use" prong permits application of the
broad standard for establishing accomplice liability in certain cir
cumstances, but demands application of the narrow standard in
others. This context-responsive application of the two different
standards leads to a consistent and unified rule of liability that is
faithful to Judge Hand's formulation of complicity in Peoni. This
21.

Complicity refers to the act and intent that render one

an

accomplice.
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Note concludes with a consideration of the overriding all-or
nothing nature of complicity in punishing the accomplice as a prin
cipal, and identifies the need for greater sensitivity to context in
order to render an unwieldy doctrine more docile, and, conse
quently, more just.
J.

INTERPRETING THE LAW OF COMPLICITY

This Part explicates the doctrine of accomplice liability as for
mulated in Peoni in order to inform the fashioning of an appropri
ate standard of aiding and abetting under section 924(c). Section
I.A explains the derivative nature of complicity and suggests how
this informs a critical distinction between the mens rea of accom
plice and principal toward the principal's crime, and the mental ele
ment required of the accomplice toward his own conduct in order
to punish him on a level with the principal. This distinction has
important implications for the rule of complicity under section
924(c): the accomplice must know that the principal uses or carries
a gun during the predicate crime, but must also act intentionally to
assist or influence him to do so. Section I.B explores the role of the
intentional act requirement in triggering accomplice liability.
Complicity is a difficult doctrine conceptually because it embod
ies a unique rule of criminal responsibility that imposes the same
punishment on different individuals - principal and accomplice according to different sets of acts and different criminal states of
mind. The doctrine is still more difficult to apply to section 924(c),
as that statute defines an offense of "carrying" or "using" a firearm
only in relation to a second, underlying predicate violent or drug
trafficking offense. As a result of the many actors, actions, and in
tentions at play, it is all too easy to confuse who is doing what, and
why. The sections that follow attempt to distinguish and then relate
the elements of act and intent concerning the predicate crime to
those concerning the section 924(c) offense. A central feature of
this project is that the contours of the latter are defined in terms of
the former.
A.

Derivative Responsibility and Accomplice Intent

Accomplice liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2 holds a person crimi
nally responsible for acts that he assists or influences another party
in performing.22 This puts an unusual spin <?n criminal responsibil22. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1954); Nye & Nissen v. United States,
336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study
in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REv. 323, 342-46 (1985). Technically, an accom
plice may be punished as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2 if he "aids, abets, counsels, com
mands, induces, or procures" the principal's commission of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)
(1994). Kadish, however, conveniently distills the many terms that may qualify actions in
furtherance of the principal's crime into either "influence" or "assistance." See Kadish,
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ity. The criminal law is rooted, in part, in the retributive principle
that blame is justly deserved only for, and in proportion to, the
harms that one causes by his or her own voluntary acts.23 Accom
plice liability, by contrast, imposes criminal responsibility on one
person for the voluntary acts of another. Liability is in this sense
derivative. Although liability under section 2 requires a separate,
individually voluntary act of influence or assistance by the accom
plice, the accomplice is not considered culpable for a separate crime
of influencing or assisting the principal; rather his act makes him
derivatively responsible for the principal's crime as a matter of
law.24 The accomplice is punished as if he were the principal, but
then only as a function of his own act of influence or assistance,
which would not, standing alone, constitute the commission of the
crime for which he is punished.25
Notwithstanding certain finer theoretical deficiencies,26 the de
rivative nature of accomplice liability underscores an important dis
tinction in the law of complicity between the mental state required
supra,

at 342-43. Because these two generalized headings provide a more manageable ac
count of the list of actions encompassed by 18 U.S.C.§ 2, they will be used as a shorthand for
the language of § 2 throughout this Note.
23. For a discussion of retributive theories of punishment, see C.L. TEN, CruME, GUILT,
PuNiSHMENT 38-65 {1987).

AND

24. See Pereira, 341 U.S. at 9-10 (citing Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 618 (noting that the
theory that " 'one who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures the commission
of an act is as responsible for that act as if he committed it directly'
is well engrained in
the law" (citing the trial court's jury instructions))); United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282,
1285 {8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1236-37 (7th Cir. 1989);
Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New
Solutions to an Old Problem, 31 HASTINGS LJ. 91, 97-98 (1985).
•

•

•

25. For further discussion of the derivative nature of accomplice liability, see Kadish,

supra note 22, at 337-42.

Kadish identifies two basic outcomes of this derivative relationship.

Frrst, a secondary actor generally cannot be held liable unless the principal actually commit
ted the wrongdoing. See id. at 338. 1\vo secondary implications follow from tWs point: (a) a
secondary actor cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting a crime unless that crime was
actually committed; and {b) a secondary actor cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting a
crime committed by the principal if the principal incurs no liability upon himself, for example
when a principal feigns intent to commit the crime precisely in order to ensnare his accom
plice in the crime. Second, derivative liability allows a secondary actor to be held liable as an
accomplice for aiding and abetting another to commit a crime that the secondary actor is not
himself capable of committing. See id. at 338-39.

26. The derivative concept of accomplice liability is not without conceptual flaws. For
example, if accomplice liability is derivative of the principal's liability, it follows that the level
of liability imposed on the former could not exceed that of the latter. Yet, as Kadish argues,
the accomplice who cold-bloodedly provokes the principal to kill in the heat of passion ought
to incur greater liability than the principal. See Kadish, supra note 22, at 340. Kadish sug
gests three situations in which derivative complicity doctrine fails:
[w]here the primary party is not culpable and therefore incurs no guilt that the accom
plice can be made to share; where the principal is guilty, but of a lesser crime than the
secondary party deserves to be held for; and where the secondary party risks but does
not intend the unlawful actions of the primary party.
Id. at 369. Although the reader should be aware of these deficiencies, fuller discussion is
beyond the designs of this Note. For a more thorough examination of these issues, see id. at
340-42.
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of the accomplice toward the principal's commission of the offense,
and that required of the accomplice toward his own act in further
ance of the principal's commission of the offense. The federal stan
dard for accomplice liability, embodied in Judge Learned Hand's
Peoni rule, recognizes this distinction.
In United States v. Peoni, 27 the defendant Peoni sold counterfeit
bills to Regno, who then sold the same bills to Dorsey, all three of
whom knew that the bills were counterfeit. Peoni was convicted on
three counts of possessing counterfeit money; one count for his own
possession, and two more counts deriving from Regno and Dorsey's
possession of the bills.28 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
Peoni could not be held liable for Dorsey's possession because Pe
oni had no "purposive attitude" toward Dorsey's subsequent pos
session of the bills after Regno.29 In other words, once Peoni sold
the bills to Regno, Regno was free to dispose of the bills as he
chose and might just as well have passed the bills himself than have
sold them to a second possible passer.30 The court stated the rule of
accomplice liability to demand that the accomplice "in some sort
associate himself with the· venture, that he participate in it as in
something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action
to make it succeed. "31
Later cases have understood the "association" requirement of

Peoni to mean that the defendant accomplice must possess the same
mental state with respect to the elements constituting the princi
pal's crime that is required to convict the principal for the offense.32
Thus, whether the crime committed calls for specific purposive in
tent, knowledge of the facts constituting the offense, or simply reck
lessness or negligence to convict the principal, the accomplice must
also have that same mental state toward the principal's commission
of the crime.33
With respect to the accomplice's own conduct, however, the lan
guage of Peoni requires that the accomplice intentionally act to fa
cilitate the principal's crime - that he affirmatively "seek by his
27. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).

28. See 100 F.2d at 401.
29.

See 100 F.2d at

30.

See

402.

100 F.2d at 402-03.

31. 100 F.2d at 402.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 953F.2d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1992); see also LAFAVE
& Scarr, supra note 11, § 6.7, at 141-44; Grace E. Mueller, The Mens Rea of Accomplice
Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2169, 2190-91 (1988).
33. More precisely, the accomplice must have at least the same level of culpability as the
principal. Of course, an accomplice might have a higher level of culpability than the principal
with respect to the principal's crime and still qualify as complicitous toward its commission.
See supra note 10.
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action to make it shcceed."3 4 Beyond sharing the principal's level
of culpability toward the elements constituting the principal's crime
- which may vary depending on the crime in question - the ac
complice must, in all cases, purposively intend that his own actions
influence or assist the principal to commit the acts constituting that
offense.3 5 As noted by commentators on complicity theory, this in
tentional act requirement is independent of, and additional to, the
mens rea required toward the offense of the principal. 3 6 Thus sec
tion 924(c), under which knowledge of the facts constituting the of
fense provides the requisite level of mens rea, results in two
different standards of culpability for the accomplice's state of mind:
one toward the principal's conduct, and another toward his own
conduct in assisting the principal. The accomplice must share in the
principal's knowledge that he uses or carries a gun during and in
relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking, he also must per
form some act with the purposive intent that it influence or assist
the principal's knowing use or carrying of the firearm. A secondary
party who merely knows that his actions will assist or influence the
principal's commission of a crime, or who acts recklessly or negli
gently with respect to a risk that his actions will do so, cannot be
held liable as an accomplice. 3 7
The intentional act requirement of complicity has two important
implications in the section 924(c) context. First, this requirement
dictates that a secondary actor should not be held liable as an ac
complice for crimes that go beyond the conduct that the secondary
actor intended to assist or influence.3 8 Thus, where the principal
uses a gun to commit an assault but the secondary actor merely
seeks by his action to assist in the commission of an unarmed as
sault, the latter cannot be deemed an accomplice to the armed as
sault of the former because he does not associate himself with the
34. Peon� 100 F.2d at 402; see also EDWARD J. DEVTIT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS§ 18.01, at 692 (4th ed. 1992) (explaining that before a defendant may be

held responsible for aiding and abetting others in the commission of a crime, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the intention of causing
the crime charged to be committed); LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 11, § 6.7, at 143-48;
Kadish, supra note 22, at 347-49.
supra note 22, at 346-48.
at 349; LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 11, § 6.7, at 136.

35. See Kadish,
36. See id.

37. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 11,§ 6.7, at 145-48. Kadish suggests that the inten
tional act requirement of criminal accomplice liability operates similarly to a manifestation of
consent to liability under principles of civil agency law. The intention to further the acts of
another serves to identify the secondary actor with the principal actor's conduct. If liability
resulted for acts that are not intentionally, but only knowingly, in furtherance of the criminal
acts of another, fear of criminal liability may constrain people from engaging in otherwise
lawful conduct merely on account of their awareness of what other people do. See Kadish,
supra note 22, at 353-55.
38. See Kadish, supra note 22, at 348, 350.
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use of the gun.39 The second implication is that because the inten
tion required for accomplice liability - to assist the principal in
committing the crime - focuses precisely on the end commission,
the secondary actor can still be held liable as an accomplice if the
principal should use different means to that end.40 Thus, if the sec
ondary actor intends by his actions to assist the principal commit an
armed assault, and the principal unexpectedly brandishes a gun in
stead of a knife, the secondary actor is still liable as an accomplice
to the armed assault that he intended by his actions to assist.41 This
still leaves open the question, however, of the extent or degree of
intentional assistance or influence necessary for courts to hold that
actor liable as an accomplice under section 924(c).
B.

Facilitative Acts

There is no decisive or affirmative standard governing the
threshold actus reus requirement for complicity, and virtually any
act of influence or assistance will suffice. Once it is established that
the accomplice bears the requisite criminal intent, courts may find
that even minimal and trivial contributions qualify as facilitation of
the crime.42 This is because the law of complicity is centrally con
cerned with the accomplice's intent to contribute. Returning to the
derivative nature of complicity, it is the principal's commission of
the offense, and not the acts of assistance or influence; for which
the accomplice is punished.43 When the accomplice seeks by his
actions to contribute to the principal's crime, he voluntarily identi
fies himself with it and effectively adopts it as if his own.44 Know
ing contribution, while indicative of an acceptance or resignation
toward the principal's conduct, does not show that the accomplice
affirmatively embraced the principal's offense. Only when the ac
complice's own conduct manifests an intent to further the criminal
acts of the principal will the law then impute those acts to him.
This is not to say that the acts of the accomplice would be irrele
vant if courts somehow could be positive of an intent to assist the
principal without them. The function of the facilitative act is two
fold: to evidence intent, and to manifest a willingness to act on that
39.

See id.

at 350.

40. See id. at 350-51.
41. The question remains whether and when the accomplice to such an armed assault
should be held liable as an accomplice under§ 924(c) for the principal's introduction of a gun
into the crime. For analysis of that question, see infra Part IV.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[O]nce knowledge
on the part of the aider and abettor is established, it does not take much to satisfy the facilita
tion element."); Dressler, supra note 24, at 102.
43.

See supra

notes 22-26 and accompanying text.

44. See Dressler, supra note 24, at 109-10; Kadish, supra note 22, at 354-55.
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intent. The law does not punish thoughts alone.4 5 It imputes the
acts of a principal to an accomplice only when the latter both in
tends to assist or influence the former and demonstrates a willing
ness to act on that intent, even though the acts may not have
causally, but merely probably, contributed to their intended re
sult.4 6 It is both the thought and the effort that count. The rel.evant
question then becomes when purposive intent can be inferred on
the part of an accomplice within the respective contexts of "use" or
"carrying" of a firearm by the principal violator of section 924(c).

II.

ANATOMY OF SECTION 924(c)

Section 924(c) criminalizes either the "carrying" or "use" of a
firearm, "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crim�." 4 7 This Part breaks down section 924(c) into its
component "use" and "carrying" prongs, and explores the meaning
courts have constructed for these two terms and the requirement
that the act of "use" or "carrying" occur "during and in relation to"
the predicate crimes covered by the statute.4 8 Section II.A explains
45. See generally JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.01, at 64
(1987) ("[T]he criminal law does not punish persons for thoughts, but only for actions that
result from thoughts."); Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of
the Entrapment Defense, 73 V A. L. REv. 1011, 1057-58 (1987); George P. Fletcher, On the
Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1443, 1452 (1994).
,
46. Unlike the principal's own liability for committing the offense, accomplice liability
requires no causal relationship between the accomplice's intentional acts in furtherance of
the crime and the principal's ultimate commission of it. See Dressler, supra note 24, at 99;
Kadish, supra note 22, at 357. Therefore, it is sufficient that the accomplice's assistance or
influence merely encourages or makes it easier for the principal to commit the crinie,
although the crime may well have been committed as it was and when it was, without the aid
of the accomplice. See LAFAVE & Scon, supra note 11,§ 6.7, at 140-41. Even so, no accom
plice liability attaches to attempted assistance or influence that is totally ineffectual and un
known to the principal, because acts unknown to the principal simply could not have assisted
or influenced him in the commission of the offense. See Kadish, supra note 22, at 358-59.
Professor Kadish thus summ arizes the rule as one of probability, attaching liability to acts of
assistance or influence that "could have contributed to the criminal action of the principal."
Id. at 359.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) (1994).
. 48. In 1984 Congress amended the language of§ 924(c) to provide "during and in rela
tion to" as a requisite nexus between the "use" or "carrying" of a firearm and the predicate
crime. See S. REP. No. 98-225, supra note 3, at 313. This language replaced the term "unlaw
fully" as qualifying "carrying" or "use" in the commission of a federal felony. See S. REP.
No. 98-225, supra note 3, at 314 n.10. The revised language was designed to preclude applica
tion of the statute to situations in which the firearm's presence, although unlawful for reasons
independent of§ 924(c), was merely coincidental to the crime. See S. REP. No. 98-225, supra
note 3, at 314 n.10; see also Riordan, supra note 10, at 43-47. Consistent with Congress's
design, the Supreme Court has interpreted the "in relation to" element to require that the
knowing use or carrying of the gun at least facilitated or had the potential of facilitating the
predicate offense. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993). While Congress
introduced the "during and in relation to" requirement as a separate statutory element in its
own right, the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts have subsequently further refined
its meaning in the context of discussing the proper meanings of "use" and "carrying." See
infra sections II.A and B.
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how the Supreme Court redefined the meaning of "use"under sec
tion 924(c) in 1995 to exclude mere possession or storage of a fire
arm and to require active employment of the weapon in the course
of a predicate violent or drug-trafficking crime. Section II.B ana
lyzes the definition of "carrying" that has emerged in the wake of
the Supreme Court's insistence on a nonsuperfluous definition for
"use"and highlights the critical fact that the two terms address mu
tually exclusive sets of cases. Thus, while the active employment of
a firearm presents an operative factor in the predicate crime, the
"carrying" of a firearm does not. This contextual distinction will
have important implications for the ultimate question addressed in
Parts III and IV: when courts may infer a purposive intent on the
part of an accomplice to the predicate crime to assist or influence a
principal's violation of section 924(c).
A. "Use" Defined
In Bailey v. United States, 49 the Supreme Court undertook to
clarify the meaning of "use"under section 924(c), a question that
had become a "source of much perplexity in the courts,"producing
"conflict both in the standards ...articulated ...and in the results
... reached."50 The Court reinvigorated the meaning of "use" to
require "active employment" of a firearm by the defendant that is
"calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of the
predicate offense."51 In so doing, the Court explicitly created a def
initional distinction between "use"and "carrying"such that the two
terms would apply to separate kinds of cases.52
Defendants Bailey and Robinson had each been found guilty of
section 924(c) violations relating to their respective convictions on
federal drug offenses.53 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
had consolidated the two cases and affirmed both convictions under
section 924(c)'s "use"prong. In interpreting "use"the D.C. Circuit
applied an "accessibility and proximity" test and held that "'one
uses a gun ... whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a particular
place from which one (or one's agent) can gain access to it if and
S. Ct. 501 {1995).
S. Ct. at 505 (citations omitted).
116 S. Ct. at 508.
See 116 S. Ct. at 507 (rejecting the government's

49. 116

50. 116
51.

52.
breadth that no role remains for 'carry'

"

reading of "use" that is "of such

)

.

53. Bailey was pulled over by police for minor moving violations. A search of the car's
interior revealed one round of ammunition and 30 grams of cocaine in the passenger com
partment, and the police found cash and a loaded 9mm handgun in the trunk. Robinson was
arrested after she sold crack cocaine to an undercover police officer out of her apartment. In
executing a search warrant on the premises, police discovered an unloaded .22-caliber pistol
and several grams of crack inside a locked trunk in the bedroom closet. See 116 S. Ct. at 503-

04.
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when needed to facilitate a drug crime.'"S4 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, declining to endorse an interpretation of
"use" so broad that it would leave no meaningful role for "carry
ing"as an alternative basis of liability under the statute.ss Quoting
Judge Williams' dissent from. the appellate opinion, the Court ar
gued that the test formulated by that court was "'either so broad as
to assure automatic a:ffirmance of any jury conviction or, if not so
broad ...unlikely to produce a clear guideline."'S6 The Court rea
soned that if Congress had intended the statute to reach mere "stor
age" or "possession" of a firearm as in the case of Bailey and
Robinson, it would have provided language to that effect.S7 In the
same vein, the Court assumed that the language of the statute
would not proscribe both "use" and "carrying"unless Congress in
tended each term to have a "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning."S8
Accordingly, Bailey narrowed the meaning of "use" to include
only "active employment" of the firearm by the defendant, such
that the firearm becomes an operative factor in relation to the pred
icate offense.s9 The Court expanded on its new definition, asserting
that active employment included "brandishing, displaying, bar
tering, striking with, and . . . firing or attempting to fire" the
weapon.60 Even reference to the presence of a firearm - disclos
ing or mentioning that one has a gun or that a gun is concealed
nearby and is readily accessible - falls within the meaning of "use"
if calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of the
predicate crime.1
6 So too does the silent but obvious and forceful
presence of a gun at the site of a drug-trafficking or violent crime.2
6
Concluding that neither Bailey nor Robinson actively employed a
firearm by these terms, the Court remanded for consideration of
possible liability under the "carrying" prong.3
6

54. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 505 {quoting United States
1994) (en bane)).
55.
56.
57.

See

36 F.3d at 124-25 {Williams, J., dissenting)).

S. Ct. at 507.

58.

See 116

See 116 S.

60.

Bailey,

116 S. Ct. at 506.

59.

61.

Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir.

116 S. Ct. at 507.

116 S. Ct at 506 (quoting

See

v.

Ct. at 505.

116 S. Ct at 508.

See 116 S.

Ct. at 508.

62. The Court distinguished this type of obvious and forceful presence from the mere
"inert" presence of a firearm, which, without more, is not sufficient to trigger liability. See
116 S. Ct at 508.
63. See 116 S. Ct. at 509. The case is currently on remand to the district court.
United States v. Bailey, No. 90-3119, 1996 WL 103727 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 1996).

See
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"Carrying" Defined

While the holding in Bailey explicitly addressed only the con
tours of "using" a firearm under section 924(c), the Court's decision
nevertheless informed the meaning of "carrying" one as well by re
quiring that this second prong of section 924(c) address itself to a
particular, nonsuperfluous set of cases. Thus, whereas the active
employment definition of "use" contemplates a firearm that is an
operative factor and actually facilitates the predicate offense, courts
have interpreted "carrying" to contemplate a more subtle standard:
one that defines a certain potential for facilitation. Specifically,
courts have held that in the wake of Bailey, possession or storage of
a firearm at or near the location of a drug-trafficking or violent
crime cannot fall within the ambit of "carrying" a firearm.64 Posses
sion and storage remain insufficient even though the firearm may
be readily available and therefore serve to comfort and embolden
the defendant.65
Courts instead have read "carrying" to require two essential
conditions. First, the weapon must actually be transported, whether
in a vehicle, on a defendant's person, or about his person - for
example, concealed in a handbag or suitcase; and second, the fire
arm must be under the defendant's dominion or control and avail
able for use contemporaneously with the commission of the
predicate offense.66 Under the "carrying" prong then, the firearm
necessarily remains concealed and never actually is brought to bear
on the predicate crime. Were the circumstances otherwise to in
clude even the mention or display of the gun, they would constitute
"use" under the terms of Bailey. One might relate the two terms as
follows: "carrying" refers to the transportation of a concealed fire
arm that has no bearing on the circumstances of the predicate
crime, but that is nevertheless readily available for "use" in a man
ner that does effect a change in the circumstances of the predicate
crime.67 The distinction will prove instructive as to the issue of
United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1464-65 (10th Cir. 1996) (interpreting
116 S. Ct at 508); United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 1996)
(same). This conclusion is consistent with Congress' 1984 amendment of the language of
§ 924(c) to provide that the firearm must be used or carried "during and in relation to" the
predicate crime, in order to preclude coverage of cases where the presence of a firearm at the
crime was merely coincidental. See supra note 48.
64.

See

Bailey,

65.

See Bailey,

116 S. Ct at 508.

66. See, e.g., United States v. Willett, 90 F.3d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1149,
1154 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676-78 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir. 1996).
67. There is some variation among circuits regarding just how available the firearm must
be to qualify under "carryin g." For example, the Second Circuit has held that the driver of a
vehicle could be convicted under the "carryin g" prong where a firearm, concealed beneath
the change dish, was within easy reach. See Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 677. A back-seat passenger
of the same vehicle, however, could not be held liable since he could not have reached the
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when a court can properly infer that an accomplice to the predicate
crime also aids and abets the principal's section 924(c) ·offense.
III. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY UNDER SECTION
924(c)'s "CARRYING" PRONG68

This Part unites the discussion of complicity doctrine from Part I
with the meaning of "carrying" a firearm addressed in Part II, and
concludes that the narrow standard of accomplice liability recog
nized by the courts should apply in the carrying context. One
should only be held responsible69 for the act of another in carrying
a firearm in relation to either a violent or drug-trafficking crime if
one acts intentionally to facilitate the carrying of the firearm on
that occasion.7o
gun from where he sat. See 80 F.3d at 676. The Tenth Circuit by contrast, held that the driver
of a van could be held liable under the "carrying" prong for a gun contained in a bag at the
rear of the van. See Miller, 84 F.3d at 1260. Rather than focusing on the accessibility of the
gun to the defendant, the court stressed the close proximity of the gun to the drugs that were
also at the back of the van and that were the subject of the predicate offense. See Miller, 84
F3d at 1260.
It might appear at first glance that the "carrying" prong swallows the "use" prong whole,
because a defendant would likely have to "carry" a gun at some point in order to "use" it.
All "use" cases might therefore be charged under the "carrying" prong, even though "use"
and "carrying" mean two different things. There are two responses to this observation. Frrst,
it is undoubtedly true that in many cases, "use" and "carrying" may provide alternative bases
for a § 924(c) conviction because a defendant engaged in both. "Carrying" involves con
cealed transportation, however, and there remain any number of possible cases of "use" that
would not qualify under this definition. In the course of a drug transaction, for example, a
drug dealer might refer to a firearm that is sitting in plain view on a nearby table in order to
scare his customer. The dealer has "used" the gun according to Bailey but has neither con
cealed nor transported it at any point during the predicate crime. More important, however,
the availability of alternative bases for the principal's § 924(c) liability in no way diminishes
the importance of the difference between "use" and "carrying" to the analysis of accomplice
liability advanced in this Note.
68. The reader may notice that the order of analysis in Parts III and IV - addressing
accomplice liability under the "carrying" prong and then under the "use" prong - reverses
the order of presentation in Part II. This asymmetry is unavoidably incident to the analytical
development of the Note's central thesis. In Part II, discussion of "use" precedes that of
"carrying" because the meaning of "carrying" only takes shape when viewed in light of the
B ailey decision's "nonsuperfluous" definition of "use." See supra section H.B. Parts III and
IV discuss "carrying" followed by "use" because the distinction drawn infra Part IV between
the standard of accomplice liability in incidental use versus integral use cases necessarily
builds on the analysis of accomplice liability in "carrying" cases.
69. Throughout the analysis that follows in this Part and in Part IV, it makes no differ
ence whether a defendant charged as an accomplice under § 924(c) was a principal or an
accomplice to the predicate crime. This Note refers hereafter only to an "accomplice" to the
predicate crime for two reasons: first, to avoid the excess verbiage of repeatedly specifying
"or principal"; second, and more importantly, if the rule holds an accomplice to the predicate
crime liable as an accomplice to the § 924(c) violation, it also would necessarily hold liable a
principal violator of the predicate crime.
70. The Second Circuit has stated the rule as follows:
[T]hat a defendant knew that a firearm would be carried, even accompanied by proof
that he performed some act to facilitate or encourage the underlying crime in connection
with which the firearm was carried, is insufficient to support a conviction for aiding and
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The broad standard is inapplicable because, in the context of
carrying as defined by Bailey and subsequent lower court decisions,
the Peoni requirements of "association" and "participation" in the
predicate offense do not manifest an intent purposively to influence
or assist in the principal's commission of the section 924(c) viola
tion. Under the mutually exclusive definitions of use and carrying,
a firearm that is carried during and in relation to the predicate
crime is extrinsic to the commission of the predicate offense. The
principal's gun cannot effect a change in the circumstances of the
predicate crime lest it become a case of use. Thus, the principal
may commit the crime regardless of whether he decides to carry a
firearm. Accordingly, the predicate accomplice's actions intended
to bring about the principal's underlying violent or drug trafficking
crime do not necessarily constitute action designed to bring about
the section 924(c) offense - just as Peoni's sale of counterfeit bills
to Regno did not evince a purposive intent toward their later sale to
Dorsey.71
Moreover, the fact that the accomplice· may participate in the
predicate offense knowing that the principal is carrying or will carry
the firearm fails to establish that the defendant is anything more
than indifferent toward the principal's doing so. Certainly, one can
make a strong argument for punishing such knowing participation.
Society might well want to sanction and seek to deter a defendant's
willingness to engage in a drug-trafficking or violent crime in which
a firearm presents an immediate potential for use.72 The question,
however, is whether the defendant deserves to be punished as if he
had carried the firearm and created that potential himself when in
fact someone else did. In such a case, the defendant does not suffi
ciently endorse the principal's conduct as something he himself
would knowingly bring about absent any manifestation of purposive
intent to assist or influence the principal in carrying the gun. Only
the narrow standard therefore affords the requisite inference that
the accomplice sought by his actions to assist or influence the prin
cipal in carrying a firearm during the predicate crime. Short of di
rect facilitation of the carrying of the firearm, the defendant's
actions merely contribute to the circumstances or context - that is,
abetting . . . . [T]here must also be proof that the defendant performed some affirmative
act relating to that firearm.

Giraldo, 80F.3d at 676. See also United States v. Luciano-Mosquera, 63F.3d 1142, 1150 (1st
Cir. 1995) ("Mere association with the principal, or mere presence at the scene of a crime,
even when combined with knowledge that a crime will be committed, is not sufficient to
establish aiding and abetting liability. . . . The defendant must have taken some affirmative
action that facilitated violation of § 924(c)(l)." (citations omitted)).
71.

See United States

v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1938).

72. See R.A. Duff, 'Can I Help
LEGAL STUD. 165, 165-68 (1990).

You?' Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist,

10

800

Michigan Law Re vie w

[Vol.

96:783

the predicate offense - that permit the section 924(c) offense of
the principal to occur.73
Application of the narrow standard requiring direct facilitation
under the carrying prong has important implications for existing
case law. In United States v. Mo rrow, 74 for example, the Sixth Cir
cuit upheld a defendant's section 924(c) conviction on a theory of
accomplice liability that is incompatible with the rule advocated
here. Morrow was arrested by agents of the United States Forest
Service who caught him, unarmed, garbed in camouflage and a ski
mask, cutting down marijuana plants from a crop concealed in a
national forest.75 He was accompanied by Mooneyham, who wore
a holstered .22-caliber handgun in plain view at his side.76 On these
facts, a divided court affirmed Morrow's conviction for aiding and
abetting Mooneyham's carrying of a firearm during and in relation
to a drug-trafficking crime.77 Citing Peoni, the court stated the rule
of aiding and abetting to require that "the defendant both associ
ated and participated in the use of the firearm in connection with
the underlying crime."78 Nevertheless, the court found Morrow to
have "participated" in the carryin g of the firearm by Mooneyham
merely on the basis of his participation in the predicate drug traf
ficking. Morrow did nothing affirmative to facilitate Mooneyham's
carrying of the firearm. He did not encourage or in any manner
advance the firearm's presence at Mooneyham's side. Rather, the
court based Morrow's liability on a precisely reversed inferential
relationship: not that Morrow's activities facilitated the carrying of
the firearm, but that the firearm facilitated Morrow's activities.
Morrow was said to have aided and abetted the carrying of the fire
arm because he was "as much a potential beneficiary of [it] being
present as was Mooneyham. The firearm was facilitating Morrow's
73. See United States v. Foreman, 914 F. Supp. 385, 387 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
74. 977 F.2d 222 {6th Cir. 1992) (en bane).
75. See 917 F.2d at 224, 230.
76. See 977 F.2d at 224.
77. See 977 F.2d at 231.
78. 977 F.2d at 230-31 (emphasis added). The Morrow court referred to "use" of a fire
arm in phrasing the applicable standard, but then in applying it to the specific facts of the
case, stated that the firearm was in fact "carried" by Mooneyham. 977 F.2d at 231. Since
Morrow was decided in 1992, before the call for "particular, nonsuperfluous meaning" in
Bailey, the court reached its holding in the context of precedent under which the meaning of
"carrying" and "use" were loosely interchangeable. Yet despite the court's analysis that
Mooneyham "carried" the weapon in relation to the drug trafficking, wearing a handgun in a
holster and in plain view would now arguably constitute "use" under Bailey insofar as the
gun is thereby brandished, displayed, or assumes an obvious, forceful presence. See United
States v. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. 501, 508 {1995). While it is worth noting the possibility that this
case could fall under the use prong, this does not affect the above analysis of carrying because
it would still only qualify as incidental use in relation to drug trafficking, to which the same
standard of liability should apply as for carrying. See infra section IV.A.
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drug trafficking efforts just as it was for Mooneyham."79 The court
inferred from the certainty of Morrow's awareness of the firearm,
combined with the fact that he wore a ski mask during the offense,
that he intended that the weapon be present for his own, as well as
Mooneyham's, protection.80
Five dissenting judges criticized the majority for failure to show
an affirmative act whereby Morrow sought to bring about Mooney
ham's carrying of the firearm.81 The dissenters argued that the ma
jority's rationale transformed a charge of aiding and abetting into a
rule of strict liability.82 Surely that is not the case, given that the
majority holding still required Morrow to have participated in the
predicate crime knowin g that Mooneyham carried a firearm. Nev
ertheless, although Morrow may have benefited from the presence
of Mooneyham's gun, and even intended that the gun protect him
as well as Mooneyham, the reasoning is circular; the accomplice is
said to aid and abet the carrying of the firearm because the :firearm
aids and abets the accomplice. The rule dispenses with the infer
ence required under Peoni that an accomplice seek by his actions to
facilitate the conduct for which he is punished. To infer purposive
intent from the mere presence of the gun renders the intentional act
requirement of Peoni a foregone conclusion.

Morrow is significant in the larger body of case law because it is
apparently the only decision - among the many decisions that
have stated the broad standard of accomplice liability as the appli
cable rule - actually to have reached the question of the nature of
participation required by that standard under the carrying prong.83
Other cases have stated the rule to allow that a defendant may aid
and abet the carrying of a firearm without facilitating the carrying
of the firearm directly, but have done so only in dicta, primarily in
overturning a section 924(c) conviction on grounds that the defend
ant did not know that the principal carried a :firearm in the first
place.84 To the extent those cases can be read to agree with Mo r
row to endorse the broad standard of accomplice liability under the
79. 977 F.2d at 231.
80. See 977 F.2d at 231.
81. See 977 F.2d at 233.
82. See 977 F.2d at 234.
83. Although Morrow states a

rule of liability more akin to the narrow standard of liabil
ity, the court's application of the professed rule falls squarely under the broad standard in
cases in which participation in the predicate offense substitutes for direct facilitation of the
§ 924(c) offense.

84. See United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 697, 701-02 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d 551, 557-58
(11th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that
the cases that appear to advocate the first standard of accomplice liability have not reached
the participation question except in dicta in the course of holding that the accomplice lacked
the requisite knowledge of the firearm in the first place).
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carrying prong, the rule advocated here disagrees. The larger body
of cases is better construed as not having reached the question of
participation. When future cases must address that question involv
ing the carrying of a firearm, courts should require that an accom
plice act directly to assist or influence the principal to carry a gun.
This will ensure fidelity to the rule of Peoni that the presence of the
firearm during the predicate crime be something the predicate ac
complice "seek[s] by his action to make . . . succeed."BS
IV.

AccoMPLICE LIABILITY UNDER SECTION
924(c)'s "UsE" PRONG

This Part addresses when a court may infer purposive intent on
the part of an accomplice to a predicate violent or drug-trafficking
crimeB6 to aid and abet the use of a firearm during the offense.
Within the realm of "active employment" defined by the Supreme
Court in Bailey, Section IV.A draws a distinction between cases in
which the use of a firearm is "incidental" to the predicate crime of
violence or drug trafficking and those in which use is "integral" to
the commission of that offense. On the basis of this distinction,
Section IV.B concludes that in incidental use cases, only the narrow
standard of liability permits a court to infer purposive intent on the
part of an accomplice to assist or influence the principal's use of a
firearm. Section IV.C, however, concludes that in integral use
cases, the broad standard of liability permits a court to infer purpo
sive intent toward the use of a firearm from the act of aiding and
abetting the predicate crime. In those cases, it is argued, the ac
complice's efforts to assist or influence the commission of the un
derlying predicate crime also establish a specific intent to facilitate
the use of the firearm directly.

A. Incidental Use Versus Integral Use Cases
The Supreme Court in Bailey defined "use" to entail "active
employment" of a firearm during and in relation to a predicate vio
lent or drug-trafficking crime.B7 By "active employment," the
Court contemplated that the firearm would be an "operative fac
tor" in the predicate offense - that it would "bring about a change
in the circumstances" of the crime, relative to situations in which
the firearm had not been brought to bear on the offense.BB In that
85. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
86. Once again, accomplice and principal as to the predicate crime are interchangeable
with respect to the rule of accomplice liability under § 924(c). See supra note 69.
87. See Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 505 (1995).
88. 116 S. Ct. at 505, 507-08.
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sense the Court distinguished use from carrying and from instances
of mere possession or storage of a firearm.s9
Use is not only distinct from carrying, but can itself be broken
down into two different sets of circumstances that this Note terms
as integral use and incidental use. The use of a firearm is integral to
the predicate crime when the weapon's active employment is an op
erative factor in the circumstances that define the principal's com
mission of the predicate violent or drug-trafficking offense. The
definition of integral use forwarded here does not mean, however,
that the use of the firearm must be an element of the predicate
offense as defined by statute. The referent for integral use is not
the language of the statute but the factual circumstances constitut
ing a violation of that statute.90 By contrast, the use of a firearm is
incidental to the predicate crime when the weapon's active employ
ment effects a change in circumstances that merely attend, but do
not constitute, the elements of the crime's commission.
Some relatively simple hypotheticals illuminate the above dis
tinction. These examples assume, as is required for liability in all
cases, that the accomplice to the predicate crime knows that the
principal is armed during the offense. Suppose first that A engages
in a cocaine transaction with B. A is accompanied by another man,
P, who is carrying a firearm at the time. The deal turns sour when
B refuses A and P's terms. P then pulls back the tail of his shirt and
reveals the presence of his weapon in an effort to persuade the
buyer that his terms are, in fact, most generous. The firearm is ac
tively employed during and in relation to a predicate drug-traffick
ing crime.91 The use of the firearm in this instance, however, does
not change the circumstances defining the commission of the predi89. See 116 S. Ct. at 507-08.
90. Thus, one might commit bank robbery by "force and violence or by intimidation" as
that offense is defined by statute, see 1 8 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1994), but employ some weapon or
means other than a firearm to do so. The active employment of a firearm therefore is not
technically an element of the offense. But when the factual circumstances of a particular case
of bank robbery do involve the use of a firearm, the firearm constitutes the means of "force
and violence" or "intimidation" necessary to satisfy the elements of the offense as statutorily
defined.
Significantly, § 924(c) limits the set of potential predicate violent crimes to felonies that
have an element of "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the per
son or the property of another," or that involve "a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property . . . may be used in . . . committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)
(1994). It is sufficient to speak of integral use cases in terms of § 924(c)'s violent crime prong
because, to the extent that Congress could define a predicate "drug trafficking" crime that
qualifies as an integral use case as defined by this Note, it would necessarily double as a
predicate "crime of violence" as well. One can further conclude from this analysis that, be
cause in integral use cases the circumstances of a firearm's use satisfy an elemental require
ment of the predicate crime, an accomplice to the commission of the predicate offense
necessarily becomes an accomplice to the § 924(c) violation. See DEVIIT ET AL., supra note
34, § 18.01, at 692 (explaining that a defendant accomplice must have acted with the intention
of causing the crime charged to be committed).
91. See Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 507-08.
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cate offense; the sale of the cocaine that A seeks by his act of partic
ipation to assist remains the same whether P displays the firearm or
not. The use of the firearm is incidental and not integral to the
commission of the predicate crime.92
Now suppose P and A rob a bank according to the same scena
rio set out in the introduction.93 Both men enter the bank and P
holds up the teller and customers at gunpoint while A goes behind
the teller window and stuffs a bag with cash. P and A are both
guilty of bank robbery.94 What is more, in this instance, the use of
the gun counts among the circumstances defining the predicate
crime of violence, because if P had not held the teller and custom
ers at gunpoint, P and A could not have committed an armed bank
robbery.95 The use of the firearm here was integral to the commis
sion of the predicate crime.
B.

Aidin g and Abetting Section 924(c) Violations in
Incidental Use Cases

When the use of a firearm is incidental to the commission of the
predicate crime, the narrow standard of liability should apply: an
accomplice96 to the predicate offense aids and abets the section
924(c) offense only if he acts to assist or influence the principal's
use of the firearm directly, as determined independently of, and in
addition to, his participation in the predicate crime. The acts of an
accomplice purposively to assist or influence the predicate crime do
not translate into an intent to facilitate the principal's use of a fire92. Notice that it does not matter whether the incidental use of a firearm is a cause sine
qua non of the predicate crime. Perhaps if P had not displayed the gun, the drug transaction
to which A was an accomplice would not have occurred. The point is not what might or
might not have happened. Circumstances can change quickly and unexpectedly in the course
of illegal activity, particularly when firearms by nature present a threat of sudden and over
reactive violence. The point, rather, is what did happen, and what can then be said about the
intent of an accomplice to the predicate crime toward the principal's use of a firearm. The
distinction between integral versus incidental use, and circumstances that merely attend or
actually define the commission of the predicate crime, exists independently of variation in
the chain of causation or the myriad ways that a crime may rapidly and unexpectedly
develop.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113.
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Of course, § 2113 also prohibits the taking of property or
money in the custody of a bank by means not involving force and violence or intimidation.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). To say, then, that without the use of the gun P and A would not
have committed a predicate crime under § 924(c) is not to say that they might not have still
committed bank robbery. In that case, however, the bank robbery no longer constitutes a
predicate "crime of violence" as defined by § 924(c). See supra note 90 and accompanying
text.
96. The analysis applies just as readily when the defendant charged as an accomplice
under § 924(c) was a principal in the predicate crime. See supra note 69.
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arm incidental to that objective.97 Here, the circumstances of the
predicate crime that the accomplice associates with - that, in the
language of Peoni, he "seek[s] by his action to make . . . succeed"98
- are exclusive of the circumstances changed, or affected, by the
active employment of the gun Some further act on the part of the
accomplice is therefore necessary to associate him with the gun and
to infer that his objectives embrace the circumstances to which the
use of the firearm pertains. Tue accomplice's intent to further the
predicate crime does not otherwise suffice for the Peoni require
ment of an intent to assist or influence the section 924(c) violation.
Tue Morrow case discussed above is instructive.99 Although the
Sixth Circuit analyzed Mooneyham's holstered firearm as a case of
carrying, in the wake of Bailey, it might alternatively be character
ized as use: the firearm strapped to Mooneyham's side arguably
presented an "obvious and forceful presence" during and in rela
tion to his tending of the marijuana crop.100 Even so, the use of the
gun in this case is incidental to the predicate drug offense because
its "forceful presence" does not effect a change in the circumstances
constituting the commission of the offense. Tue defining circum.

,

97. But cf. United States v. Polanco, 935 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Polanco sold
cocaine out of his apartment to a confidential informant ("Cl") working for the Drug En
forcement Agency. See 935 F. Supp. at 373. During the buy, Polanco and the CI started
arguing over price and quantity, whereupon a coconspirator of Polanco moved toward the CI
and started "jumping around." See 935 F. Supp. at 374. This second individual had a gun
visible in the waistband of his pants. See 935 F. Supp. at 374. The court held that the co
conspirator, in displaying the gun to the CI in a threatening manner, "used" the firearm
under Bailey. See 935 F. Supp. at 375. The court then extended responsibility for the
§ 924(c) violation to Polanco on a coconspirator theory rather than an accomplice theory. See
935 F. Supp. at 375-76. Known as the "Pinkerton doctrine," this theory provides that a con
spirator can be held responsible for the substantive crimes committed by his coconspirators
to the extent those offenses were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the conspiracy
agreement. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946). The Pinkerton doc
trine is sometimes resurrected as an alternative theory of liability to aiding and abetting. It
has a narrower scope of application than accomplice liability in that it is only implicated in
cases involving a conspiracy agreement. A complicity theory of liability may apply to all
crimes that one person assists another in performing, whether by preexisting agreement or
not. But within that narrower set of cases, the Pinkerton doctrine defines a much broader
scope of liability, encompassing not just the acts of a principal that a defendant purposively
intends to assist, but all conduct of a principal that is a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of a mutual conspiracy agreement. Hence, the availability of the Pinkerton doctrine in cases
of conspiracy does not speak to the same concerns as the more stringent "purposive act"
standard for aiding and abetting. As in Polanco, it permits a defendant to be punished on a
level with the principal, but for a much lower level of culpability. The defendant is held fully
responsible for a co-conspirator's purposive use of a firearm, where the defendant only negli
gently failed to foresee that the use of a weapon might advance the mutual conspiracy agree
ment. For a discussion of the relationship between the Pinkerton and complicity doctrines
and an attempt to reconcile their differences, see Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and En
terprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to RIC O Actions, 56 Mo. L. REv. 931
(1991).
98. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 74-85.
100. See United States v. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1995).
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stances of the predicate offense that Morrow endeavored to bring
about - namely, the harvesting of an illicit marijuana crop - re
main the same whether Mooneyham had displayed a firearm or not.
Morrow's efforts to assist Mooneyham harvest the marijuana, to
further the circumstances constituting a drug-trafficking crime, do
not signal an intent to further the circumstances of the firearm's
use. Accordingly, the same standard of liability as applies under
the carrying prong should also apply to incidental use cases under
section 924(c).
C.

Aidin g and Abettin g Section 924(c) Violations in
Integral Use Cases

In integral use cases, the firearm is an "operative factor" that
effects a change in the very circumstances that constitute the com
mission of the predicate offense.101· In other words, use of the fire
arm defines, in part, the commission of the predicate crime, without
which a predicate crime could not be committed.102 In these cases
the broad standard of liability can be applied1°3: an accomplice104
to the predicate crime can, a fortiori, be held liable as an accom
plice to the section 924(c) violation. When an accomplice seeks by
his actions to bring about the circumstances that constitute the com
mission of the predicate crime, he seeks by those same actions to
bring about the use of the firearm, because the defining circum
stances of the predicate crime include the use of the firearm.1os In
101.
102.

See supra section IV.A.
See supra notes 90 and 95.

103. "Can" is the appropriate term because in these cases either standard of accomplice
liability should permit a court, consistent with Peoni, properly to infer that the accomplice
intended to assist or influence the principal's use of a firearm, whether directly or by some
other form of participation in the predicate crime.
104. Al; noted supra note 69, the reference to "accomplice" in the predicate crime also
embraces a principal for purposes of § 924(c) liability.
105. One might object that a person may conceivably assist or influence the predicate
crime without acting to facilitate the use of a firearm. The basis for this objection is as fol
lows. Al; discussed supra note 90, integral use refers to the defining circumstances of the
predicate crime that satisfy, but do not necessarily constitute, the statutory elements of the
predicate crime in a particular case. The federal bank robbery statute that criminalizes the
taking of property from a bank by "force and violence, or by intimidation" provides a useful
example. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1994). The statutory elements of bank robbery do not require
the use of a firearm for a violation, but the use of a firearm in a particular case of armed bank
robbery satisfies the element of "force and violence" or "intimidation" required under the
statute, and in turn under § 924(c)'s definition of a predicate crime of violence. While the
question of integral use goes to particular circumstances, however, the question of accom
plice liability for the predicate offense asks whether a defendant acted with the intention to
assist or influence the statutory elements of the crime. Thus, it is possible to aid and abet all
the elements of the predicate crime, but not to have acted with the intention to facilitate
those particular defining circumstances involving the gun
To illustrate, suppose someone participates in a bank robbery by acting as a lookout on
the street while the principal goes inside and holds up the bank. The lookout honestly thinks
that the principal intends merely to pass a note to the teller, threatening to use a gun that the
.
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such a case, satisfaction of Peoni 's intentional act ·requirement as to
the predicate crime necessarily also satisfies Peoni with respect to
the separate section 924(c) violation.
As under the carrying prong, this Note's rule of accomplice lia
bility in the integral use context . arrives at different results than
does some of the existing case law.106 In United States v. Medina, 101
for example, the Second Circuit reversed the defendant's aiding and
abetting conviction under section 924(c) for his role in conceiving,
planning, and implementing an armed robbery scheme. In order to
execute his scheme, Medina recruited another person named Lopez
principal actually does not have. The lookout is an accomplice to the bank robbery; he acted
with the intention to assist the taking of property from a bank by "intimidation." See 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) (defining the elements of the offense of bank robbery). In fact, the principal
brandishes a real firearm inside the bank, and thus the statutory elements for bank robbery
are satisfied by the active employment of a firearm instead of an intimidating note. See 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a). How is the lookout accomplice liable as an accomplice to the use of the
firearm? The answer is that he is not liable under the rules of liability advocated by this Note
because in all contexts, whether they involve "carrying," "incidental use," or - as the case in
this hypothetical - "integral use," the accomplice must have knowledge that the principal
uses or carries a gun. If the lookout knows this, he knows, or �t least expects, that the use of
a firearm will provide the defining circumstances of "force and violence" or "intimidation"
that constitute a commission of the crime of bank robbery. By acting as a lookout, the predi·
cate accomplice acts with the intention to assist or influence a violent crime - as defined
under § 924(c) - during and in relation to which a firearm is used. In integral use cases, the
accomplice's knowledge of the firearm's presence bridges the inferential gap between acting
with the intention of advancing the predicate crime and intending by those very same acts to
advance a § 924(c) violation.
A related, more difficult question arises in a case where the lookout, or any sort of accom
plice to the predicate crime, generally knows that the principal uses a gun, but does not know
what kind of gun. The accomplice may have in mind a handgun, while in fact the principal
wields a bazooka inside the bank. Given that § 924(c) attaches longer sentences depending
upon the type of gun employed, and depending on if it is equipped with a silencer or muffler,
should the stiffer penalty also be imputed to the accomplice? Or should the accomplice who
does not know what type of firearm will be employed and does not act to facilitate a particu
lar type of weapon simply receive the minimum five-year consecutive sentence? This prob
lem is not limited to integral use cases, but may arise even when the accomplice encourages
or facilitates use of a gun directly but still without knowing or intending a particular type of
gun. In situations in which it cannot be shown that the accomplice acted with the intent to
assist or influence the principal to use the particular type of gun employed, it would certainly
seem unfair for courts to impose on the accomplice the greater sentence applicable to a
particular type of weapon.
106. See United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing a conviction for
aiding and abetting under § 924(c), and requiring specific facilitation of the firearm even
though the defendant intentionally assisted in the predicate crime of armed robbery knowing
that firearms would be used for its commission); United States v. Foreman, 914 F. Supp. 385
(C.D. Cal. 1996); see also United States v. Price, 76 F.3d 526 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v.
Salazar, 66 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995). In Price and Salazar the courts upheld convictions for
aiding and abetting § 924(c) violations in the commission of an armed robbery and armed
prison escape, respectively. See Price, 76 F.3d at 529; Salazar, 66 F.3d at 729. While these
results are consistent with this Note's rule of liability for integral use cases, the courts ob
tained the right results by applying the wrong standard, requiring an act that directly facili
tated the firearm (e.g., providing or encouraging its use) where the integral use standard
would only require that the defendants acted with intent to bring about the predicate violent
crime, knowing that firearms are used.
107. 32 F.3d 40

(2d Cir. 1994).
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to commit the crime, who in turn recruited two other individuals.1os
Medina provided a firearm to Lopez for use during the robbery, but
ultimately police recovered different guns from the principals when
they foiled the attempted robbery at the scene. 109
The court held that a defendant who is not present at the com
mission of the predicate offense cannot be said to aid and abet a
section, 924(c) violatipn merely because he knew that a firearm
would be used or carried while simply aiding and abetting the over
all enterprise in which the firearm is employed.110 Instead, the
court asserted that the language of the statute requires a defendant
to perform some act that directly facilitated or encouraged the use
of a firearm.111 The court reasoned that although Medina knew his
recruits intended to bring guns, the decision to do so was a "fore
gone conclusion" on their part. Thus, Medina's actions, including
furnishing the revolver to Lopez, did not assist or encourage the
principal to carry or use the particular gun seized from his person
during the attempted robbery.112
108. Medina planned to rob his former employer, a construction company, and he re
cruited Lopez to carry out the robbery for fear that he would be recognized if he participated
in the robbery himself. Lopez enlisted the help of Villanueva, and Delgado. Unfortunately
for Medina, Villanueva and Delgado, Lopez became a government informant. See 32 F.3d at
42-43.
109.

See 32 F.3d at 43.
See 32 F.3d at 47.
111. See 32 F.3d at 45.
112. See 32 F3d at 45-46. Firearms were never, in fact, actively employed to commit the
110.

predicate crime because the police intervened before the robbery could take place. The
court, however, did not concern itself with this detail in ostensibly creating a rule that applies
to all cases of "carry or use." See 32 F.3d at 45-47. Moreover, the court's analysis of the
proper standard of accomplice liability - and the facts of the case it found relevant to that
analysis - would not be any different if the principal had entered the construction company
and successfully robbed the premises at gunpoint. Even so, as an alternative to the wholesale
rejection of Medina's analysis advocated in the text, courts addressing integral use cases
might instead distinguish Medina on the facts as limited to a case of carrying a firearm during
a robbery attempt. To the extent that Medina is confined to a case of carrying, the court
applied the correct standard of accomplice liability: the government must prove Medina
acted to facilitate the carrying of the firearm directly. Whether the government failed to
satisfy that standard, of course, presents a different question.
Even under the narrow standard of liability, Medina's conviction still might have been
affirmed. Medina's conduct in furthering the robbery scheme expressly called for the carry
ing and use of a firearm. Medina intended that a gun be carried in relation to the robbery,
and acted on that intent by providing a firearm to Lopez for that very purpose. The fact that
the particular gun ultimately carried in the course of the attempt was not the one Medina
provided is simply a change in means toward the same ends. Recall from section I.B, supra
note 40 and accompanying text, that the purposive intent required for accomplice liability
focuses on the end commission. If the principal should use different means to that end, the
secondary actor can still be held liable as an accomplice. In the example noted above, the
secondary actor intended to assist the principal commit an armed assault, but the principal
brandished a gun instead of a knife. The secondary actor is still liable as an accomplice to the
armed assault that he intended by his actions to assist. Here, Medina intended to assist
Lopez, and through Lopez, Villanueva, carry a firearm during and in relation to the at
tempted robbery in violation of § 924(c). A change in the particular gun does not affect this
equation.
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Both the rule and the result in Medina are wrong. The reason
that the principal's use of a firearm was a "foregone conclusion"
was precisely because Medina devised, planned, and delegated the
commission of a crime that called for the principal to use a gun, be
it his own or the one provided by Medina. Medina's failed efforts
to provide a specific gun for the principal to use is the wrong focus
of inquiry. Medina conceived and encouraged the commission of
an armed robbery, the defining circumstances of which entailed the
use of a firearm. In acting to further such a scheme, Medina acted
to facilitate the use of a gun. The fact that Medina was not present
during the robbery is no basis for excusing his role in the use of a
firearm; quite the opposite is true. Those who mastermind violent
crimes involving :firearms should not be able to hide behind their
agents. Medina recruited others to carry out his plan precisely in
order to insulate himself from liability. The Medina court's failure
to penetrate this vertical structure, commonly employed by organ
ized criminals to protect the ultimate decisionmakers and their
broader enterprises,113 only exacerbates present confusion about
the proper scope of accomplice liability under section 924(c). The
facts of the Medina case114 are better resolved under an integral use
liability rule, where acts assisting or influencing the predicate crime,
a fortiori, establish that the accomplice associates with the use of
the gun and seeks by his actions to make that use succeed.
CONCLUSION

The larger conflict among federal courts in fashioning a stan
dard of accomplice liability for section 924(c) reflects the all-or
nothing nature of complicity. An accomplice is punished to the
same degree as a principal. As noted above, sometimes a seconNor can it be asserted that Medina's assistance and influence were so ineffectual as to
have no bearing on the commission of the § 924(c) offense. See supra note 46. Although
Villanueva may have resolved to carry a gun on his own, and did so regardless of the gun
offered by Medina, Medina was the very genesis of the attempted robbery, and therefore of
the related § 924(c) offense. Without his role in conceiving the plan and delegating its com
mission to Villanueva through Lopez, Villanueva would not have committed the § 924(c)
offense. Moreover, even if Medina were not the mastermind and Lopez and Villanueva had
been more co-equal sponsors of the attempt, the law of complicity does not insist on sine qua
non contribution on the part of the accomplice, but merely requires that an accomplice's acts
of assistance or influence have the potential to contribute to the commission of the offense.
See supra note 46. By providing a gun to Lopez, Medina evidenced his intent that a gun be
carried, and a willingness to act on that intent in a manner that could have assisted
Villanueva commit the armed robbery.
113. See S. REP. No. 89-72, at 7-8 (1965); Benjamin M. Shieber, Electronic Surveillance,
The Mafia, and Individual Freedom, 42 LA. L. REv. 1323, 1335-6 (1982).
114. At least, those facts of the case provided in the appellate opinion. Indeed, one of
the underlying themes of this Note is that courts simply do not conduct enough analysis of
the circumstances of use and carrying to construct appropriate rules of liability to govern
accomplices. Accordingly, the level of factual detail that may be relevant under the liability
regime proposed in this Note may not be shared in the majority of published opinions.
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dary actor merely acquiesces in the principal's use of a gun, as when
he knows that the principal will employ the weapon. Other times, a
secondary actor both knows the principal will use a gun and acts
with the intent that he do so. Both sorts of actors are culpable,
although the one who actually intends for the principal to use a gun
is more so than the one who merely resigns himself to that con
duct.115 But accomplice liability is blunt in that it either punishes
the accomplice as a principal or not at all. Decisions like Morrow,
advocating a mere "knowledge" standard of accomplice liability,
may reflect a desire to convict a culpable defendant of something
rather than nothing. Decisions like Medina, favoring the more nar
row standard of liability, reflect the concern that only the most cul
pable secondary actors should receive the full punishment of a
principal.116 Yet the holding in Medina injects the more narrow
scope of liability into the wrong context. The rule of complicity
falls short of its mark. In Morrow, accomplice liability reaches too
far. Between the two, aiding and abetting doctrine deteriorates as
courts try to navigate their way around inflexible and conflicting
standards.117 In failing to examine the relationship between prong
and predicate more closely, courts are missing an opportunity to
reconcile competing standards according to context.
This Note's purpose in identifying and distinguishing a rule of
liability for cases of carrying and incidental use from one applicable
to cases of integral use, is not to suggest that every section 924(c)
accomplice case can and must be categorized accordingly. Circum
stances of use may indeed arise, the particulars of which elude inte
gral verses incidental categorization. Nevertheless, marginal
uncertainties that lap at and erode at the edges of any formulation
of legal principle do not defeat the greater utility of the concepts
developed in this Note among the majority of section 924(c) cases.
The modest suggestion forwarded here is that when the integral use
concept lends itself to the facts of a particular case, it provides a
discrete expansion of accomplice liability under section 924(c) well founded in the theory of complicity underlying Peoni
which
in tum offers some relief to the all-or-nothing rigidity of that doc
trine and the attending confusion in its application.
-
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117. See United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 565 (2d Cir. 1996) (limiting Medina to the
fact that the use of a firearm was a foregone conclusion whereas in the present case, use of
guns was an idea originated by the defendant); cf. United States v. Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55 (2d
Cir. 1996) (resurrecting· the Pinkerton doctrine as a much broader theory of liability in the
wake of Medina's limitation on aiding and abetting); United States v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233
(2d Cir. 1996) (same); Parker v. United States, Nos. 96 Civ. 0955 (CSH), 88 Cr. 0379 (CSH),
1996 WL 609275 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1996) (same); Paese v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 667
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same).

